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Editorial note 
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Abstract 
Cash transfers (benefits and tax credits) are crucial to the way that inequalities 
develop over time. This paper looks at how Labour’s aims, policies and achievements 
on poverty and inequality related to its reforms of and spending on cash transfers. 
 Labour’s aims for poverty and inequality were selective. ‘Equality of
opportunity’ was the stated aim, rather than equality of outcome – with a
focus on lifting the lowest incomes, not reducing the highest ones.
 Labour gave priority to reducing child and pensioner poverty, addressing
them through a series of reforms. It increased the share of national income
provided through cash transfers to children and pensioners, and increased the
value of their cash transfers relative to the poverty line.
 By contrast, spending on other transfers to working-age adults fell as a share of
national income from the level Labour inherited, while benefits for those
without children fell further below the poverty line.
 By the end of the period both child poverty and pensioner poverty had fallen
considerably, in circumstances where child poverty would have risen without
the reforms (and pensioner poverty would have fallen less far). However,
poverty for working-age adults without children increased.
 The risks of poverty converged between children, their parents, pensioners,
and other working age adults. Being a child or a pensioner no longer carried a
much greater risk of living in poverty than for other age groups.
 Overall income inequality was broadly flat, comparing the start and end of
Labour’s term in office. But differences in net incomes between age groups
were much lower. The smoothing of incomes that occurred across the life
cycle could be seen as a striking, if unremarked, achievement.
A full summary of this paper is available at 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case/_new/research/Social_Policy_in_a_Cold_Climate/Progra
mme_Reports_and_event_information.asp 
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1. Aims and goals
Social security benefits – or cash transfers more generally (including other payments 
from government such as tax credits) – have traditionally had a number of aims. These 
have included not just reducing poverty, but also reducing inequality more generally, 
promoting ‘horizontal’ equity (in the sense of helping compensate for particular 
needs, such as disability or having a larger family), and smoothing income over the 
life cycle. 
The 1997-2010 Labour government was much more explicit in its objectives for 
reducing poverty of particular kinds than for the other aims such as reducing 
inequality. Its 1997 election manifesto only mentioned inequality twice and only in 
general terms. Before the election, Tony Blair had written that: 
“If the next Labour government has not raised the living standards of the 
poorest by the end of its term in office, it will have failed”.1  
This only implied, however, reducing poverty against an absolute standard, something 
achieved in nearly all periods – even on some definitions during the 1980s under 
Margaret Thatcher. Famously in a Newsnight television interview he said: 
“The issue isn’t in fact whether the very richest person ends up 
becoming richer. The issue is whether the poorest person is given the 
chance that they don’t otherwise have … the justice for me is 
concentrating on lifting incomes of those that don’t have a decent 
income. It’s not a burning ambition of mine to make sure that David 
Beckham earns less money.”2 
This emphasis on improving opportunities at the bottom – sometimes developed into 
aims of ‘equality of opportunity’ (rather than of outcomes) – was a recurring theme in 
what was argued to distinguish ‘New Labour’ from its predecessors. As Gordon 
Brown put it in 1996: 
“For too long we have used the tax and benefit system to compensate 
people for their poverty rather than doing something more fundamental 
– tackling the root causes of poverty and inequality … the road to
equality of opportunity starts not with tax rates, but with jobs, education 
and the reform of the welfare state.”3 
Reflecting this, the government’s key report and set of indicators reporting progress 
on poverty, social exclusion, and inequality was entitled Opportunity for All. The 
indicators in that document were concerned with much more than outcomes for 
income poverty, both in terms of other aspects of ‘social exclusion’ and of life 
chances. 
1 Independent on Sunday, 28 July, 1996. 
2 Quoted in Bromley (2003), p.74.  
3 Quoted in Powell (1999), p.17.  
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In government, ministers became more explicit about objectives for outcomes and for 
inequality in some form. Soon after the 1997 election, Peter Mandelson suggested that 
“doubters” should, “judge us after ten years in office. For one of the fruits of success 
will be that Britain has become a more equal society”. More specifically, two years 
later in his Beveridge lecture at Toynbee Hall in 1999, Tony Blair declared that: 
“Our historic aim [will be] that ours is the first generation to end child 
poverty forever. … It is a 20-year mission, but I believe it can be done” 
(Blair, 1999, p.7). 
This commitment said nothing about how such an ambitious objective should be 
measured, but it was quickly followed up by targets to reduce child poverty measured 
as the proportion of children living in households with less than 60 per cent of 
contemporary median income – by a quarter by 2004, and by half by 2010. Ultimately 
the objective was for Britain to become amongst “the best in Europe” in its relative 
child poverty rate (recognising that even in egalitarian Scandinavia poverty on such a 
measure had never been reduced to zero). Just before the end of its term in office, the 
government embodied its objectives for ‘ending’ child poverty in the Child Poverty 
Act (with four different indicators set out to measure this). 
The other aspect of poverty emphasised as a policy aim was for pensioners. The 1997 
Manifesto had argued that, “all pensioners should share fairly in the increasing 
prosperity of that nation”. However, it did not promise to restore the link between the 
value of the universal basic state pension and earnings growth – unlike other Labour 
manifestos since the Conservative government broke the link at the start of the 1980s. 
Indeed abandoning that pledge was one of the ways in which ‘New Labour’ marked a 
break from its past. In the 1999 Opportunity for All report (DSS, 1999) the priorities 
set for older people were:  
 Tackling the problems of low income and social exclusion amongst today’s
pensioners;
 Improving opportunities for older people to live secure, fulfilling and active
lives; and
 Ensuring that more of tomorrow’s pensioners can retire on a decent income.
Adding to this, at Labour’s 2002 party conference, Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, stated that, “Our aim is to end pensioner poverty in our country”.4 
While the Opportunity for All indicators included a similar set of indicators of 
relative, absolute, and persistent pensioner low income to those for children, there 
were no explicit targets for their reduction. 
The way in which objectives for pensioners were to be met were not seen, however, as 
only – or even primarily – to do with the structure of the state pension system. Indeed 
the 1998 pensions green paper set out the objective that as the population aged, the 
4 Cited in Goodman et al. (2003), p.2. 
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need for greater retirement incomes for a larger retired population should be met 
through a switch in the balance of pension provision from what was alleged to be 60 
per cent from the state and 40 per cent from the private sector to the reverse. Improved 
state provision was to be concentrated on the poorest pensioners rather than through 
increases in the basic pension. It was only in its third term that these strategies were 
abandoned.5 
More general aims for reducing inequality in general tended not to be stated until 
nearer the end of Labour’s period in office, and the word ‘redistribution’ was 
studiously avoided until well into its second term. But the language did begin to 
change, with the 2006 Equality Act putting a duty on the newly established Equality 
and Human Rights Commission to monitor inequality outcomes in a triennial report, 
while the first clause of the 2010 Equality Act allowed a power to put a ‘socio-
economic’ duty on all public authorities to consider in all the important decisions and 
actions they took how they could tackle socio-economic inequality (although this was 
not subsequently implemented). In 2008 the government also established an 
independent National Equality Panel6 to review the evidence on economic inequalities 
between and within population groups defined in different ways. 
Summary 
New Labour’s aims for poverty and inequality were selective. Child and pensioner 
income poverty – including when measured in relative terms – were key priorities, but 
only alongside much wider objectives for life chances and social inclusion. Equality 
was discussed in terms of equality of opportunity, not of outcomes, and little emphasis 
put on inequalities at the top of the distribution. Cash transfers (benefits and tax 
credits) from the state were not seen – rhetorically, at least – as being the central 
instrument for achieving these objectives, by contrast with public services such as 
education, health care, child care, and tackling other aspects of disadvantage, such as 
neighbourhood deprivation. When cash transfers were discussed, the aim for families 
and the working age population was described as ‘progressive universalism’ – 
something for all, alongside more for the poor – aimed at attempting to ensure that 
‘work pays’, at the same time as creating a less stigmatised system of transfers 
through the use of ‘tax credits’, described as part of the income tax rather than benefit 
system. This contrasted, however, with the initial strategy for incomes for current 
pensioners, which concentrated on means-tested benefits. Labour’s strategy was not 
explicitly framed in terms of its effects on income smoothing over the life cycle, 
although, as we shall see, that was an important side-effect of its emphasis on early 
and later life. 
The rest of this paper discusses what eventually had happened by the end of Labour’s 
time in government in 2010 in terms of these aims and objectives, focussing on cash 
5 See Evandrou and Falkingham (2009) for more detailed discussion. 
6 Chaired by the author. 
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transfers and income poverty and inequality.7 Its final decisions relating to the 
structure of the tax system and levels of benefits set from April 2010, just before its 
election defeat, finalised most of the rules of the system that applied for the whole of 
the 2010-11 financial year, having direct effects on income poverty and inequality, as 
well as spending, in that year. There is therefore some ambiguity in which year should 
be taken as the ‘end’ of the New Labour period in this area, so the paper presents 
information on trends in spending and outcomes up to both 2009-10 and 2010-11, so 
that readers can see whether the choice of ‘end year’ makes a difference to the 
assessment. 
The next section summarises the main policy developments affecting cash transfers 
between 1997 and 2010, and Section 3 charts developments in public spending over 
time and by comparison with other countries.  Section 4 examines what this meant in 
terms of the value of available public support for different kinds of household, and 
Section 5 looks at the redistributive effects of the tax and benefit reforms across the 
whole population. Section 6 examines outcomes for income poverty, and Section 7 
those for income inequality, across the whole population. Section 8 examines in more 
detail how these inequalities related to changes in those between and within groups 
defined by age and gender, and to life cycle smoothing more generally. The final 
section concludes. 
2. Policies
The main policies that affected cash incomes can be divided into four groups: changes 
affecting transfers to families with children, including the introduction of tax credits; 
pension reforms; changes to the direct tax system; and wider changes such as 
introduction of a National Minimum Wage. It is important to note that all of these 
changes were against a background where the default assumption was that benefits 
and tax allowances and brackets would be adjusted annually in line with price 
inflation (as measured by the Retail Prices Index, RPI), not in line with overall living 
standards. This meant that benefits such as Jobseeker’s Allowance were protected in 
real terms but in the period when overall living standards were growing rapidly (from 
1997 to 2003) they fell in value relative to average earnings or incomes. 
Children 
For families with children,8 the first change was actually a cut. As part of the 
incoming government’s commitment not to exceed its predecessor’s spending plans in 
its first two years, it implemented the planned abolition of special benefits for lone 
parents, both the general One Parent Benefit and the lone parent additions in Income 
7 The analysis presented here is a summary only, as this area has been covered in detail 
elsewhere. See in particular Sefton, Hills and Sutherland (2009) (some findings from which 
are updated here), Adam and Browne (2010), Cribb, Joyce and Phillips (2012), and Joyce and 
Sibieta (2013). 
8 For more details, see Stewart (2009, 2013). 
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Support. The most important change came in 1999 with a general increase in Child 
Benefit for the first child in each family, the transformation of the existing means-
tested Family Credit into a more generous Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) for 
low-earning families with children, and more generous allowances for younger 
children in Income Support for workless families (including many of the lone parents 
who had lost earlier). 
The system for administering all of this was further reformed in 2003, combining 
Income Support child allowances and the larger part of WFTC into a new Child Tax 
Credit. This was paid at the same rate and through the same system to those out of 
work and those in low-paid work. By contrast with other parts of the system, its value 
was uprated at least in line with earnings, not just prices. It also included a ‘family 
element’, which replaced what had once been the married man’s (and then married 
couples’) income tax allowance. This went to all families except those with high 
incomes (on the philosophy that it replaced tax allowances that had gone to all 
taxpayers). Additional amounts were paid to families with younger children. The new 
Working Tax Credit (replacing the rest of WFTC) went to all those working more 
than threshold numbers of hours, not just those with children but also other low-paid 
workers. This was all aimed at ‘making work pay’, but also meant an extension of 
means-testing, albeit in a new form, to a wider group with low to middle incomes. 
After 2003 tax credits were seen as part of the income tax system, administered by 
HM Revenue and Customs rather than by what had become the Department of Work 
and Pensions, and run on the basis of annual income assessments, with adjustments to 
payments during and after the year in an attempt to make sure that the right amount 
was eventually paid out. This attempted to match what the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) 
system does for income tax, and gave flexibility as people’s circumstances changed 
within the year. But it resulted in extensive under- and over-payments where the 
payments had not been adjusted within the year, requiring later additional payments or 
(unpopular) reclaims. 
Pensions 
Following a Green Paper in 1998, a first wave of pension reform had three main 
components.9 Income Support for pensioners was separated off to become the 
‘Minimum Income Guarantee’, with its value increased in real terms and then linked 
to earnings (unlike Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance for those of working-
age). This means-tested support was further reformed in 2003, with the minimum 
becoming the ‘guarantee credit’ of Pension Credit. This included an additional means-
tested element for those with incomes just above the minimum, the ‘savings credit’. 
This was designed to reduce the number of pensioners facing a 100 per cent 
withdrawal rate on small amounts of retirement income – but at the cost of extending 
a lower means-testing rate to a larger group. Rather than general increases in the basic 
pension a number of new concessions were introduced on a universal basis, including 
Winter Fuel Payments, free TV licences for the oldest pensioners, and concessionary 
or free bus travel. 
9 See Evandrou and Falkingham (2009) for a more detailed discussion of pension reforms up to 
2008. 
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The second element of the first wave of reform was to change the way in which 
people still at work accrued rights to state pensions, beginning the process of turning 
what had been the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), paid on top of 
the flat rate basic pension, into the State Second Pension (S2P). This gave better 
future pension rights to low-paid workers, as S2P was less related to past earnings 
than the old SERPS system. In addition, the government tried to boost the 
accumulation of private pensions through the introduction of ‘stakeholder pensions’, 
with limits on the charges that providers could levy each year. This was an attempt to 
open up better value retirement savings to those outside good value occupational 
schemes. In the end this had little impact, however, as the cap on charges limited 
interest from providers, but the cap was still high enough to mean that those putting 
aside small amounts could lose a considerable proportion of their potential savings 
through charges. The government also faced the accusation that one of its earliest 
revenue-raising moves had been to reduce tax relief for pension fund income and that 
this was one of the elements contributing to withdrawal or scaling back of employer 
provision. 
 
Near the start of Labour’s second term in office, in 2002, a further Green Paper 
announced an independent Pensions Commission to review the way in which future 
pension rights were being accumulated. Its first report in 2004 identified substantial 
structural problems with the way pensions were evolving, including a rapid decline in 
private sector pension accrual, greater prospective reliance on means-tested support in 
retirement in future (as the basic pension remained price-linked, but the means-tested 
minimum was earnings-linked) acting as a barrier to encouraging extra saving, and 
little prospect of private provision meeting the demand for greater pension flows as 
the population aged. Its second report in 2005 put forward three key reforms designed 
to address these problems, the main elements of which were introduced with all-party 
support in the 2007 and 2008 Pensions Acts. These were: 
 A return to earnings-indexation of the basic pension and a widening of rights to 
it (particularly for women) coupled with further moves to make the state 
second pension more flat rate. This was designed to give a more valuable but 
less means-tested floor to retirement income on which people could build non-
state pension rights. 
 Future increases in state pension age to reflect growing life expectancy and to 
allow the state system to serve an ageing system without the flows being spread 
ever more thinly over a larger retired population. 
 Introduction of ‘automatic enrolment’ into people’s employer pension scheme 
(or a new low-cost national funded scheme, eventually established as the 
National Employment Savings Trust), with minimum contributions from 
employers and employees – but with the right of people to opt out of this, 
rather than full compulsion to join. 
The effects of all these reforms started only after Labour left office, and are now being 
carried further, but they may in the long-term represent its greatest permanent mark on 
the cash transfer system. 
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Direct taxation 
While New Labour avoided the language of redistribution, a series of reforms to direct 
taxation were also designed to make it more progressive. This included reforms to 
National Insurance Contributions (NICs), such as ending the remaining regressive 
element of flat rate minimum contributions, increasing the level from which 
contributions were payable (with changes in employer contributions that partly 
softened the impact on them of the National Minimum Wage). The main rates of NICs 
were increased in 2003 (including at a low rate on earnings above the normal upper 
limit) with the proceeds advertised as being earmarked for increased spending on the 
NHS.  What had been two major income tax allowances – for mortgage interest and 
for married couples – were finally abolished (with parts of the latter absorbed into the 
tax credit system and with pensioner couples protected). An initial move had been to 
reduce the starting rate of income tax to 10 per cent, with much made of its positive 
effects on the low-paid, but this ‘10p band’ was removed in 2008 at the same time as 
the main rate was cut to 20 per cent. The combination of the two left some low earners 
who were not entitled to (or did not receive) tax credits as losers, even after an 
emergency increase in the general level of tax allowances the following Autumn. 
Labour market 10 
The backdrop to all this – and often stressed far more by the government – were 
measures aimed at boosting employment and wages when in work (as well as the 
general stress on and resources going to education). At the centre of these were the 
‘New Deal’ welfare-to-work programmes for the young unemployed, lone parents, 
long-term unemployed, and partners of the unemployed as well as the introduction of 
the first National Minimum Wage from April 1999. The latter was seen not just as 
justified in its own right, but also as an underpinning to the supplementation of low 
wages through tax credits. Gradually through the period of the government, the degree 
of conditionality for working age social security payments increased, with for instance 
removal of an option of remaining on benefit for young unemployed people and later 
reductions in the age of youngest child after which lone parents became subject to 
conditions for actively seeking or moving towards employment (to age 7 from 
October 2010). Some benefits were allowed to run on for short periods after people 
found work, to reduce financial uncertainty in the transition from unemployment. The 
1999 Welfare Reform and Pensions Act merged the systems for claiming benefits and 
helping with job search, and more extensive support for job-seekers was provided 
through the new ‘JobCentre plus’ offices.11 Introduction of joint claims meant that 
members of a couple without children were treated equally in terms of both the 
services available and the conditions for active job search. Benefits for people out of 
work because of disability were reformed into a new Employment Support 
Allowance, with claimants’ treatment depending on the results of a new Work 
10 See McKnight (2009) and Gregg and Wadsworth (2011), chapters 1,2 and 5, for more detail 
of labour market policies and their outcomes across the period. 
11 Such as calculations showing people’s position in work, assistance with in-work benefit and 
tax credit applications, and work-focussed interviews delivered through personal advisers and 
much better use of new technology. 
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Capability Assessment. An experimental Employment Retention and Advancement 
pilot explored the effects of continuing support for people after they had found work 
and of bonuses for those who stayed in work for particular periods.  
Summary 
Overall, this set of policies – perhaps unsurprisingly – reflected the core aims 
described in Section 1. For the working age population the emphasis was on 
education, training, ‘making work pay’ and support into work rather than real 
increases in social security benefits. By contrast, financial support for families with 
children through tax credits in and out of work was made more generous in real terms 
in pursuit of child poverty reduction targets, but alongside a series of other measures 
aimed at the early years and wider aspects of social exclusion.12 The emphasis here 
was on ‘progressive universalism’ with increased transfers to all families with 
children, but most for those with lower incomes. Pensioners also benefited from 
increased support, but this was mainly on a means-tested basis (apart from items such 
as the new Winter Fuel Payments), until a major reform introduced at the end of 
Labour’s period which was designed to improve more universal pensions in the long 
term, but with the quid pro quo of future increases in state pension age. Direct taxes 
were reduced to some extent for those on low incomes, but increases for those with 
higher incomes were generally limited, until the response to the economic crisis from 
2008 included an increase in the top rate of income tax first to 50 per cent for incomes 
above £150,000, but taking effect only from 2010-11, that is mainly after Labour had 
left office. 
3. Spending on benefits and tax credits
The policy changes described above complicate a straightforward comparison of 
spending on cash transfers over time for several reasons. First, responsibility for Child 
Benefit was moved from what is now the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) 
to HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in 2003 and is no longer part of DWP benefit 
spending. Second, what had been a social security benefit – Family Credit – was first 
transformed into the Working Families Tax Credit in October 1999. This was then 
combined with what had been child additions within Income Support to form the 
Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit in April 2003. During the period what had 
been a tax allowance – the Married Couples Allowance (for couples aged under 65) – 
was also effectively turned into part of the tax credit system, but had not previously 
been counted as part of public spending.  
Recent analysis by DWP attempts to produce a consistent time series, and the results 
of this are shown in Figure 1 (and Appendix Table 1).13 In 1996-97 total social 
12 See Waldfogel (2010) and Stewart (2013). 
13 Figures exclude Council Tax Benefit but include Housing Benefit. For consistency they 
exclude payments that had been made at the start of the period through Income Support for 
residential care, but are now in other budgets. They also do not allow at the start of the period 
for what would have been spending on non-pensioner Married Couples Allowance, but 
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security spending in Great Britain was £114 billion (at 2009-10 prices). By 2009-10 
social security spending and Child Benefit had risen to £154 billion and tax credits 
cost £27.5 billion, so the total of cash transfers had reached £181.5 billion, nearly 60 
per cent higher in real terms. It rose by a further £1.3 billion in 2010-11, taking the 
overall real increase to 61 per cent to that year. 
As the figure shows, more than half of the real increase – £37 billion by 2009-10 – 
was accounted for by benefits for pensioners, and more than half of all transfers now 
go to pensioners. The figure divides the rest of the spending between items aimed at 
children – mainly Child Benefit, Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit for 
families with children (and their earlier equivalents, such as Family Credit and 
WFTC) – and other transfers for the working age population (which includes items 
such as the adult parts of Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance, including for 
parents, as well as Housing Benefit for working age families). Those allocated here 
for children rose from £16 billion to nearly £40 billion, accounting for nearly all of the 
rest of the real increase in spending.14 Other working age benefits and tax credits rose 
much more slowly, from £41 to £48 billion. 
Figure 1: Social security benefits and tax credits, 1996-97 to 2010-11 (£ billion, 
2009-10 prices, Great Britain 
Source: Table A1.  
became part of tax credits from 2000-01. This would have been £2 billion in 2000-01 (at 
2009-10 prices), or 0.17 per cent of GDP (HM Treasury, 1999, FSBR table 1.11 gives cost as 
£1.6 billion; adjusted to 2009-10 prices by GDP deflator). 
14 See Stewart (2013), table 3, for a more detailed breakdown of transfers for children since 
1997-98, calculated on a slightly different basis, but showing the same overall trends.  
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Figure 2 shows the same flows as a share of total public spending (Total Managed 
Expenditure). Before the economic crisis, in 2007-08, total transfers had fallen to a 
lower share of public spending (26.0 per cent) than they had been in 1996-97 (27.4 per 
cent).  Even in 2009-10 and 2010-11, with unemployment rising, they were still no 
higher (27.0 and 27.2 per cent respectively) than at the start. Within this static overall 
share, spending on pensioners rose, but that on other working age transfers fell (from 
9.8 to 7.1 per cent in 2009-10 and 7.2 per cent in 2010-11). 
 
Figure 2: Social security benefits and tax credits as % public spending, 1996-97 
to 2010-11 (GB) 
 
Source: Table A1. 
 
Finally, Figure 3 shows these flows in relation to national income. The total initially 
fell from its starting level of 10.8 per cent of GDP 1996-97 but then fluctuated within 
a narrow range to remain slightly lower (10.6 per cent) in 2007-08 than at the start. As 
the crisis hit, and unemployment rose and real GDP fell, the total rose sharply to 12.8 
per cent of GDP in 2009-10 (and 12.7 per cent in 2010-11). Looking over the period 
as a whole from 1996-97 to 2009-10, spending on pensioner benefits rose and 
transfers for children each rose by 1.3 percentage points of GDP, while other working-
age benefits were a smaller share of GDP, 3.4 per cent in 2009-10 and 3.3 per cent in 
2010-11– even in the wake of the economic crisis – than the 3.9 per cent they had 
been in 1996-97. This contrasts sharply with the increases in spending as a share of 
GDP on health, education and early years provision which we describe in other papers 
in this series. 
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Figure 3: Social security benefits and tax credits as % GDP, 1996-97 to 2010-11 
(GB) 
 
Source: Table A1. 
 
International comparisons 
All this meant that in international terms UK spending on cash transfers remained 
low, as can be seen from the OECD figures for 30 countries in Table 1. This series 
allows comparison of cash transfers (including tax credits when introduced) as a share 
of GDP in 1995 and 2009. In 1995 UK cash transfers had been twentieth out of 30 
countries, rising to seventeenth in 2009. In 2009 UK spending, calculated at 11.8 per 
cent of GDP on OECD’s definitions15 remained a smaller share of national income 
than in any other Western European country apart from Norway. The more detailed 
breakdown in Appendix Table A2 reflects the pattern shown in Figure 3 – UK 
spending on old age and survivors benefits and on family benefits rose as a share of 
GDP, while that on other cash benefits fell. This left the UK as the eighteenth highest 
spender on old age and survivors benefits in 2009 and nineteenth for other cash 
benefits. However, on the OECD’s classification the UK’s spending on family 
benefits, 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2009, had risen to being the third highest, behind only 
Luxembourg and Ireland (and equal to New Zealand). 
15  Compared to 12.8 per cent of GDP in 2009-10 on the definitions used by DWP and presented 
in Figure 3. 
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Table 1: Public spending on cash transfers as % of GDP, 1995 and 2009 
 
  1995 2009 
 
Finland 
 
20.2 
 
17.0 
Austria 19.1 19.2 
Poland 17.5 15.2 
Belgium 17.3 18.1 
France 17.1 18.9 
Sweden 16.6 13.7 
Denmark 16.4 14.0 
Germany 15.4 15.7 
Netherlands 15.0 11.4 
Spain 14.9 16.0 
Luxembourg 14.6 14.4 
Italy 14.1 18.9 
Norway 12.9 11.6 
Slovak Republic 11.8 11.3 
Greece 11.6 15.7 
New Zealand 11.6 10.6 
Portugal 11.0 16.9 
Canada 11.0 10.0 
Ireland 10.8 13.8 
United Kingdom 10.7 11.8 
Czech Republic 10.4 12.7 
Israel 9.4 9.4 
Australia 9.0 8.0 
United States 8.3 9.6 
Chile 7.9 5.4 
Japan 7.5 12.4 
Iceland 6.3 7.7 
Turkey 3.7 7.3 
Korea 1.6 3.4 
Mexico 1.2 2.7 
 
Source: OECD social expenditure dataset (extracted 2 April 2013). UK cash transfers in 2009 include 
tax credits. 
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The balance between public and private sectors 
Direct public spending is only one way in which the state achieves its overall income 
maintenance aims, however. It can also promote private provision, for instance 
through tax reliefs, while people save for pensions or insure themselves against 
unemployment or sickness privately. It can also require people to make private 
transfers to one another – for instance, child support from absent parents. Table 2 
shows how such flows changed over a period mainly covering Labour’s period in 
government from 1995-96 to 2007-08. It distinguishes between the roles of public and 
private sectors across three dimensions: who provides the activity; who finances it; 
and who decides on the level of provision or what provider is used.16 
Table 2: Public and private spending on income maintenance, 1995-96 and 2007-
08 (£ billion, 2008-09 prices) 
Provision Finance Decision 1995-96 2007-08 
Public provision Public finance Public 107.7 150.1 
Private 6.0 11.5 
Private finance Public - - 
Private - - 
Private provision Public finance Public - 0.3 
Private 25.9 29.3 
Private finance Public - 1.0 
Private 25.8 53.2 
All 165.4 245.4 
Source: Hills (2011), table 1, based on Edmiston (2011), tables D and E. 
The bulk of social security and tax credit spending falls into the ‘pure public sector’ 
category, with public provision, finance and decision. This rose from £108 to £150 
billion (at 2008-09 prices in this table) over the period. But indirect public finance 
through tax reliefs also rose over the period – either for private provision (through 
‘contracting out’ National Insurance Contribution rebates or other favourable tax 
treatment of pensions) or for public provision through the State Second Pension.17 
Together these rose from £32 to £41 billion. At the same time ‘pure private’ activity – 
mostly private pension contributions over and above tax reliefs – doubled from £26 to 
£53 billion. As a result of this the total flows related to income maintenance rose by 
nearly half in real terms, from £165 to £245 billion. Within this the share of the pure 
16 See Hills (2011) and Edmiston (2011) for a more detailed discussion of patterns over this 
period for welfare activity defined more broadly. The figures in Table 2 (unlike those in 
Figures 1-3) exclude Housing Benefit and Income Support for Mortgage Interest, which are 
included within housing-related spending in the original analysis. 
17 Where people could have claimed a contracting out rebate, but chose not to, making this a 
private decision. 
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public sector and of public finance in total both fell. Private sector flows – dominated 
by pension contributions – grew most rapidly, but not by enough greatly to disturb the 
dominant role of the public sector within income maintenance, and certainly not 
rapidly enough to move towards Labour’s initial aim of reversing the proportions of 
pensions that were financed publicly and privately. 
 
Summary 
The figures in this section show clearly the impact of New Labour’s priorities and 
policies as discussed in the previous two sections. There is not a picture of spending 
on cash transfers rising out of control. Until the crisis cash transfers were kept within 
a constant share of GDP, with those for pensioners and aimed at families with children 
gaining at the expense of other working age benefits. By 2009-10 and 2010-11, 
working age benefits other than for children were still more than an eighth smaller as 
a share of national income than Labour had inherited in 1997. It was spending on the 
priority areas of pensioners (including some effects of an ageing population) and 
families with children where spending rose as a share on national income, and it was 
only for the latter where this meant that UK spending rose significantly in 
international terms. Overall spending on cash transfers remained in the bottom half of 
the range in relation to national income in all OECD countries, and one of the two 
lowest in Western Europe. The relative importance of the public sector within income 
maintenance defined more broadly reduced slightly between 1995-96 and 2007-08, as 
private pension contributions rose, but there was not a major increase in the role of the 
private sector despite the government’s early ambitions for future pension provision. 
 
4. Social security and tax credit levels and work incentives18 
A key output from the social security and tax credit system is how well they succeed 
in keeping people clear of the poverty line if they have no or low levels of earnings. 
Table 3 compares the levels of minimum income (after housing costs) provided by the 
state since 1997-98 for different kinds of household through Income Support or its 
later equivalents with two kinds of poverty line. For 2010-11 (set from April 2010, 
just before Labour left office) these corresponded, for instance to £65.45 per week for 
single people aged 25 or over, £235.29 for a couple with two children, and £140.42 
for a lone parent with one child. 
 
The first four columns compare these levels with the official relative income poverty 
line given by 60 per cent of contemporary median income in each year, while the last 
two columns compare them with the Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s ‘Minimum 
Income Standard’ calculated for each household type after consultation with members 
of the public on necessities for each household type and their cost.19  
18  For more detailed discussion of some of the trends reported here up to 2008-09, see Sefton, 
Hills and Sutherland (2009), pp. 30-34. 
19  See Bradshaw et al. (2008). MIS data for 2010 are derived from 
http://www.minimumincomestandard.org/budget_summaries_2008_2012.htm.  
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There is again a strong contrast between the position of pensioners and families with 
children compared to that of working age adults without children. What became the 
guarantee credit level for pensioner couples rose from 83 per cent of the official 
relative poverty line in 1997-98 to nearly reach it, at 96 per cent by 2010-11. For 
single pensioners the rise was from 93 per cent to 110 per cent by the end of the 
period, taking the minimum (if claimed) clear of the poverty line. For pensioners in 
both 2008 and 2010, the minimum guarantee from the state exceeded their Minimum 
Income Standard. 
 
For workless families with children there were small rises in benefit levels compared 
with the official poverty line, which were more significant for those with two or three 
children. There was a rise for all these cases between 2008-09 and 2010-11 as benefit 
levels were protected in real terms, but overall real median incomes fell. By the end, 
benefits for families with children ranged from 69 to 85 per cent of the poverty line 
and 61 to 65 per cent of the Minimum Income Standard. 
 
But for working age adults without children, whose benefits were mainly linked to 
prices rather than earnings, the position was very different, with substantial falls in 
benefits relative to poverty lines. For a single person aged 25 or older the fall was 
from two-thirds to only just over half the poverty line, and for a couple without 
children from 60 per cent to just under half. In each case they reach only 40 per cent 
of the Minimum Income Standard. 
 
The policies described above resulted in a clear restructuring of the benefit system for 
those out of work – getting closer to the poverty line for families with children and 
above it for pensioners, but falling further behind it for others without children, where 
the aim of policy was to move people out of poverty by promoting work rather than 
through increasing transfers. 
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Table 3: Income Support levels in relation to poverty thresholds and Minimum 
Income Standard by family type, 1997-98 to 2010-11 
% of poverty line1: % of MIS2: 
1997-98 2000-01 2004-05 2008-09 2010-11 2008 2010 
Single, 18-24, no children 52 47 42 40 42 - - 
Single 25+, no children 65 59 52 51 52 42 41 
Couple working age, no children 60 54 48 46 48 42 40 
Couple, 1 child aged 3 67 67 66 66 69 62 61 
Couple, 2 children aged 4,6 67 70 73 75 78 62 62 
Couple, 3 children aged 3,8, 11 71 72 79 82 85 61 62 
Single parent, 1 child aged 3 81 78 80 81 84 67 65 
Pensioner couple (aged 60-74) 83 83 90 93 96 106 102 
Single pensioner (aged 60-74) 93 93 103 108 110 109 103 
Source: Sefton, Hills and Sutherland (2009), table 2.4, extended and updated. 
Notes: 
1. The poverty threshold used is 60% of median incomes (After Housing Costs) in that year
from DWP (2012) and earlier equivalents.
2. 2008 MIS figures are from Table 8 of Bradshaw et al (2008) and show Income Support/
Pension Credit levels in April 2008 as a percentage of the Minimum Income Standard (MIS)
for each family type (excluding rent, council tax and childcare costs). See Bradshaw et al
(2008) for further details. 2010 MIS figures from 
http://minimumincomestandard.org/budget_summaries_2008_2012.htm
The effects of the emphasis on ‘making work pay’ through the tax credit system can 
be seen in Figure 4. This compares net incomes as modelled by DWP after direct 
taxes, benefits and tax credits for four hypothetical household types with the poverty 
line for those with earnings of half the national average in each case. The striking 
feature is the sharp rise when the Working Families Tax Credit was introduced in 
October 1999 for a couple with two children – from 80 per cent of the poverty line to 
100 per cent of it – and for a lone parent from 120 to 140 per cent of the line. After 
2000-01 the ratios remained roughly constant for all four cases, apart from a slow fall 
for single people with no children, although they remained well clear of poverty. The 
structural reforms in 2003 left these ratios generally unchanged. 
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Figure 4: Net incomes after taxes and benefits as % of poverty line (60% median 
income after housing costs) for families with half average earnings 
Source: Sefton, Hills, and Sutherland (2009), figure 2.4a, extended (using methodology as in DWP, 
2008). 
Figure 5 shows the position in more detail for couples with two children and different 
levels of earnings and those with none. For those with half and two-thirds of average 
earnings there was a sharp jump in relation to the poverty line when WFTC was 
introduced. The position of those with average earnings remained constant. The value 
of Income Support for out of work families rose by less in 2000-01 than did net 
income for those with low wages – so the difference between incomes out of work and 
in low-paid work increased. But, as Table 3, showed there were continued rises in the 
relative value of Income Support over the following decade, so the differential 
narrowed again, although that compared with half average earnings remained wider in 
2010-11 than at the start of the period. The figure also shows that the differences in 
net income between those couple with children and gross earnings of half or two-
thirds of the average and those with average earnings narrowed significantly. 
This raises the issue of work incentives. As far as public beliefs are concerned, there 
was a sharp rise in the number questioned by the British Social Attitudes (BSA) 
survey who preferred the statement that benefits for unemployed people are “too high 
and discourage work” to one that benefits are “too low and cause hardship”. In 1996 
only 32 per cent preferred the former statement, but 48 per cent the latter. By 2004 54 
per cent preferred the “too high” response and only 23 per cent said they were too 
low, proportions which were identical in 2010. Over the same period, the proportion 
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agreeing that, “if benefits were less generous, people would stand on their own two 
feet” rose from 33 to 55 per cent.20  
Figure 5: Net incomes after taxes and benefits as % of poverty line (60% median 
income after housing costs) for couples with two children and different earnings 
Source: Sefton, Hills, and Sutherland (2009), figure 2.4b, extended 
Adam and Browne (2010) look in detail at the actual effects of all the changes in taxes 
(direct and indirect), benefits and tax credits over the period on work incentives 
measured in three ways: 
 Participation tax rates (for first and second earners) – the proportion of gross
earnings taken away through taxes or lower benefits, if someone moves out of
work into work.
 Replacement rates – an individual’s net income out of work as a proportion of
income in work.
 Effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) – the share lost in taxes or reduced
benefits if someone in work increases their earnings. They look – over a thirty
year period – at what happened to the distributions of these three measures
across the population at different dates, and at what the effect of tax and benefit
reforms was by themselves on a constant population, abstracting from
demographic and labour market changes.
Comparing the actual distributions in 1996-97 with those in 2009-10, mean and 
median participation tax rates were virtually unchanged, but there was a slight fall in 
20 Clery (2012), tables A.3 and A.5. 
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the very highest rates and a small rise in the lowest ones. Across the distribution, 
replacement rates were slightly lower in 2009-10 than in 1996-97 – that is, in general, 
incentives to work at all strengthened over the period.21 At the same time, for those in 
work mean and median effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) rose slightly, but there 
was a large increase in the highest levels of EMTRs. In 1996-97 a tenth of those in 
work faced EMTRs over 55 per cent or more, but by 2009-10 a tenth faced EMTRs 
above 75 per cent, with the large increase happening as the new tax credit system was 
introduced in 2003.22 In other words for some cases, the incentive to earn more if 
already in work declined. However, while Dickens and McKnight (2008) found that 
there was some evidence of improved employment retention after the changes, there 
was none of adverse effects on wage progression within jobs.   
Looking at the extent to which these changes resulted from tax and benefit reforms, 
average participation tax rates and replacement rates were both lower under the 2009-
10 tax and benefit system than they would have been under the 1996-97 system, if it 
had been uprated in line with GDP growth.23 For those without children, as Table 3 
shows, out of work income fell in relation to the poverty line and median net incomes. 
For those with children, the rise in out of work was generally more than matched for 
those in low-paid work, as illustrated in Figure 5. In those respects, the reforms 
improved average incentives to work at all, especially for lone parents (but they were 
weakened for second earners in a couple). However, average effective marginal tax 
rates for those at work (including the effects of indirect taxes) would have been 49 per 
cent under the uprated 1996-97 system, but were 51 per cent under then actual 2009-
10 system.24 In that respect, the reforms reduced average incentives to increase 
earnings, particularly for working parents, again as illustrated in Figure 5. 
Summary 
Looking at the structural changes to benefits, tax credits and taxes, the most striking 
effects came with the first wave of tax credit reform in 1999, which improved net 
incomes in relation to the poverty line for families with children in low paid work. 
Out of work incomes for families with children rose to some extent at the same time 
and continued to rise slowly in relation to the poverty line. Pension reforms took 
minimum incomes for pensions up to or even above the poverty line, but working age 
benefits for those without children who were out of work fell further below it. 
A corollary of such changes might have been expected to be deteriorating work 
incentives for those with children. Public attitudes surveys certainly suggest much 
more widespread belief in disincentive effects at the end of Labour’s period in office 
than at the start. However, the actual overall pattern of incentives to work at all was 
little different in 2009 -10 than it had been in 1996-97. What did reduce somewhat 
21 Adam and Browne (2010), figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
22 Adam and Browne (2010), figure 4.3. 
23 Adam and Browne (2010), figures 4.4 and 4.5. 
24 Adam and Browne (2010), figure 4.6. 
19 
was the incentive for some of those in work to earn more, particularly as more 
working families were affected by the tax credit means-tests: such families were better 
off than they would have been without the tax credits, but at the margin gained less 
from extra earnings. 
5. Redistribution
Measuring the redistributive effect of the reforms described in Sections 2 and 4 can be 
done in a number of different ways. The key issue is what is assumed to constitute an 
unreformed system – that is, what would have happened in the absence of structural 
changes. There are two main choices here. One is that the system inherited in 1997 
would have been uprated in line with price inflation – any real increases in benefit 
levels then show as a gain to the income groups affected, for instance. But this kind of 
benchmark is not neutral in many ways – the relative generosity of benefits and values 
of tax allowances would be falling in relation to incomes, for instance, so other things 
being equal, relative poverty rates would increase over time, and the public finances 
would improve substantially as benefits became easier to finance and ‘fiscal drag’ 
increased direct tax revenues as a share of GDP.25 An alternative therefore is to 
compare the reformed system with what the inherited one would have looked like if 
all its elements had been uprated in line with a measure of income growth, such as 
earnings or GDP per capita. While the former approach is more common in official 
presentations, the latter arguably gives a clearer guide to the redistributive effect of 
policy. 
Comparisons can vary in two other ways: first, as to what is included within the range 
of policies, such as indirect taxes (such as VAT) as well as direct taxes (such as 
income tax); and second, what is used as the way of defining which income group a 
household would be in (that is, whether it is the income they would have had before or 
after the reform). 
Figure 6, taken from Sefton, Hills and Sutherland (2009), compares the overall 
redistribution achieved by Labour’s benefit and direct tax reforms up to 2008-09, 
against a price-indexed base in the upper panel and against an earnings-uprated base 
in the lower panel. In each case the results are shown in terms of the position 
households would have occupied under the unreformed 1996-97 system. The three 
bars in each diagram show the cumulative effects of reforms up to 2000-01, 2004-05 
and 2008-09 respectively. The upper panel shows the large real gains compared to a 
price-indexed base for what would have been the bottom three income groups – 25 per 
cent for the poorest tenth of households and more than 10 per cent for the next two 
groups. On this basis the top two groups were slightly worse off than they would have 
been under the price-uprated 1996-97 system. What is also clear from the panel is that 
the main reform effects happened between 2000-01 and 2004-05, with only limited 
gains for each income group beyond that when the whole period is included. 
25 See Sutherland, et al. (2008) for further discussion. 
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Figure 6: Distributional effects of benefit and direct tax changes, 1996-97 to 
2008-09,  
(a) Relative to price-indexation of policies 
(b) Relative to earnings-indexation of policies 
Source: Sefton, Hills and Sutherland (2009), figure 2.5, based on analysis using POLIMOD. 
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The lower panel makes the redistributive effect of Labour’s reforms clearer. 
Compared to a base where the inherited system was uprated with average earnings the 
gains for the bottom income groups are more modest – 8 per cent for the bottom tenth 
and less than 5 per cent for the next two groups – but still positive, while the rest of 
the distribution emerge as losers, by up to 3 per cent for the top income group. 
Figure 7 shows analysis by Adam and Browne which extends the time period up to 
2009-10, Labour’s last full year in office. The analysis also includes the impact of 
indirect tax changes, such as in VAT rates, which offset some of the progressive 
effects of the direct tax reforms. It is also based on the income groups households 
were in under the 2005 system, that is, after the bulk of the reforms, rather than before 
them. This places some of the large gainers from the changes higher up the 
distribution than in previous figure, while some of those who did not benefit – such as 
low-income working age households without children – remain at the bottom. The two 
bars show the comparison for the whole period against a price-indexed base and 
against one where the inherited system was uprated in line with per capita GDP. 
Figure 7: IFS estimates of distributional effects of tax and benefit reforms from 
1997 to 2009 compared to price- and GDP per capita uprating 
Source: Adam and Browne (2010), figure 3.8. 
The inclusion of indirect taxes and the use of income groups as they were in 2005, 
after the effects of the initial reforms, reduce the scale of the gains to lower-income 
groups on either basis by comparison with Figure 6, but the overall result is similar. 
The 2009-10 tax-benefit system was considerably more generous to low-income 
groups than a price-uprated version of the inherited system, while the difference for 
higher income groups was small. Compared with a GDP-indexed base, the picture is 
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again more clearly redistributive, but with modest gains (3-4 per cent) for the bottom 
four income groups and modest losses (up to 2 per cent) for the top four groups. 
 
These comparisons are for each income group on average – within each there are both 
gainers and losers. In particular different household types fared better or worse under 
the reforms. Adam and Browne (2010, figure 3.9) show that, compared to a GDP-
uprated base, lone parents were 4-7 per cent and couples with children 1-5 per cent 
better-off (depending on whether they were earning) and single pensioners 5 per cent 
better off. By contrast single people without earnings were 9 per cent worse off and 
couples without children 5 per cent worse off than in the unreformed system. This 
confirms the pattern shown in Section 4. 
 
Summary 
Taken as a whole, Labour’s tax and benefit reforms were clearly redistributive 
towards those with low incomes on average. The scale of this redistribution was 
relatively modest when the comparison is made with the inherited system uprated in 
line with measures of income growth, but was none the less progressive, contrasting 
sharply with the regressive effects of reform in the period from 1978 to 1997.26 This 
redistribution was, however, selective, with families with children and pensioners 
gaining but workless single people and couples without children losing. 
 
6. Outcomes: Poverty rates 
Official statistics on the proportions of the population with low incomes present 
information in a variety of ways – measured against income thresholds that are fixed 
in real terms, ones that are relative to contemporary median incomes, each against a 
variety of levels (eg. 50, 60 or 70 per cent of median income), and before and after 
allowing for housing costs.27 The indicators used by the Labour government to 
measure progress also included a combined measure of low income and deprivation 
(in the sense of lacking particular items) and measures of persistent low income. 
 
Overall income poverty rates 
Figure 8 shows the contrast between poverty rates for the whole population measured 
against an absolute threshold (60 per cent of 1996-97 median income before housing 
costs) and against a relative threshold (60 per cent of contemporary median income 
before housing costs). In 1996-97, 19.4 per cent of individuals had incomes below 
both thresholds. Against the fixed threshold, the overall poverty rate fell rapidly to 
below 11 per cent by 2002-03, but then only slowly and unevenly to 9.2 per cent by 
26  For instance, Adam and Browne (2010, figure 3.6) show a loss for the bottom income group 
of more than 20 per cent when the 2009-10 system is compared with the 1978 system uprated 
in line with GDP per capita, despite the gains from the reforms under Labour. Conversely the 
top income group emerges as gainers from the whole period of reform from 1978 to 2009, 
despite their losses after 1997. 
27  See DWP (2012) or Cribb, Joyce and Phillips (2012) for detailed analysis on the full range of 
measures. 
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2009-10. Notably there was a rise in the final year of this series to 9.6 per cent in 
2010-11. 
Figure 8: Proportion of population with income below 60% of 1996-97 median 
income in real terms and below 60% of contemporary income (BHC) 
Source: DWP/IFS Households Below Average Income analysis (from IFS Poverty and Inequality 
spreadsheet 2012). 
The second line shows the relative measure on which attention is more commonly 
concentrated, given that perceptions of minimum acceptable living standards tend to 
move over the medium- and long-term with general living standards. Here progress 
was slower – as one would expect against a line that was rising in real terms – and 
more uneven. From the same starting point of 19.4 per cent of individuals in 1996-97 
it fell to a low point of 17.0 per cent in 2004-05, before rising again to 18.3 per cent in 
2007-08, but then falling through the first part of the recession to 17.0 per cent in 
2009-10 and 16.1 per cent in 2010-11. The fall in the final year was because general 
living standards fell in real terms, while the value of social security benefits was held 
constant. Such year-to-year movements in median incomes can be more rapid (in 
either direction) than one would expect perceptions of what constitutes poverty to be 
(which is why it is helpful to look at both relative and absolute standards), but looking 
over the long term relative poverty clearly fell (continuing a trend which had started in 
the early 1990s, after the sharp rise in poverty of the 1980s). Indeed, in the final year 
in these terms, overall poverty was lower than at any point for 25 years.  
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Poverty rates for particular groups 
The two panels of Figure 9 break these totals down between four population groups. 
The upper panel shows that using the fixed threshold, the proportions below it more 
than halved for children (from 26.7 to 9.4 per cent by 2010-11), pensioners (from 24.6 
to 9.5 per cent) and working-age parents (from 20.2 to 8.8 per cent). However, the 
proportion of working-age non-parents below even this fixed line only fell from 12.0 
per cent to 8.9 per cent in 2002-03 and had climbed back to 10.1 per cent in 2010-11, 
above the overall average. Strikingly, there was a very clear convergence in poverty 
rates against this threshold: being a child or a pensioner no longer meant that someone 
had a higher poverty risk than others. 
There was, however, a sharp contrast between different household types, as can be 
seen from the lower panel of Figure 9 and from Table 4 (showing figures both before 
and after housing costs). For children, relative poverty (before housing costs) fell over 
the period as whole by more than 9 percentage points to 17.5 per cent. This was by 
more than a third by 2010-11, which would generally be seen as a considerable 
achievement, but fell short of Labour’s explicit target of halving it by 2010. 
Correspondingly, poverty rates also fell for working age parents, from 20 to 16 per 
cent (more slowly as the fall was most rapid for families with more children). Poverty 
also fell by a quarter for the government’s other priority group, pensioners. However, 
relative poverty rose for working age adults without children, from 12.0 to 14.6 per 
cent, still below the overall poverty rate on this measure, but much closer to the 
overall average than at the start.  Again, the result was very clear convergence in 
poverty risks for the different groups. The table shows similar trends when incomes 
are measured after housing costs, but in this case the most rapid fall is for pensioners, 
more than halving over the period.28 
28 See Joyce and Sibeita (2013), figures 7 and 8 for trends since 1979. 
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Figure 9: Proportion of population with income below 60% of 1996-97 median 
income in real terms and below 60% of contemporary income (BHC) by 
population group 
(a) Percentage below fixed real threshold 
(b) Percentage below relative threshold 
Source: DWP/IFS Households Below Average Income analysis (from IFS Poverty and Inequality 
spreadsheet 2012). 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Children
Pensioners
Working-age
parents
Working-age non-
parents
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Children
Pensioners
Working-age
parents
Working-age
non-parents
26 
Table 4: Changes in relative poverty, 1996-97 to 2010-11 
% of individuals below 60% of median income Change: 1996-97 
to 2010-11 (% 
points) 1996-97 2000-01 2004-05 2006-07 2010-11 
Before housing costs: 
Children 26.7 23.3 21.3 22.3 17.5 -9.2 
Working age with 
children 
20.2 18.1 16.9 17.9 16.0 -4.2 
Working age without 
children 
12.0 12.8 12.6 13.2 14.6 +2.6 
Pensioners 24.6 24.8 21.3 23.2 17.5 -7.1 
All 19.4 18.4 17.0 18.0 16.1 -3.3 
After housing costs: 
Children 34.1 31.1 28.4 30.5 27.3 -6.8 
Working age with 
children 
26.6 24.7 23.0 25.2 24.3 -2.3 
Working age without 
children 
17.2 16.2 16.1 17.6 19.7 +2.5 
Pensioners 29.1 25.9 17.6 18.9 14.2 -14.9 
All 25.3 23.1 20.5 22.2 21.3 -4.0 
Source: Sefton, Hills and Sutherland (2009), table 2.2, extended and updated using Households 
Below Average Income data from Institute for Fiscal Studies Inequality and Poverty spreadsheet. 
Poverty plus a pound? 
One suggestion has been that policy was finely tuned to achieve reductions against 
these particular thresholds, but little more – that is, that a different result would be 
seen against other thresholds. If so, the reductions for families with children and 
pensioners could be criticised as achieving no more than ‘poverty plus a pound’. 
Table 5 suggests, however, that this was not the case. There were, for instance, 
reductions for children in all of the income bands before housing costs up to 60 per 
cent of median income, and no grouping in the bands above that, while for pensioners 
the reductions extended up to the 60-70 per cent band (before housing costs). More 
generally, overall poverty rates over the period fell against relative thresholds taken as 
50, 60 or 70 per cent of median incomes before and after housing costs.29 Only if a 
very low threshold is taken of 40 per cent of median income was there a slight rise in 
overall poverty numbers – but these figures relate to a very small proportion of the 
population reporting the lowest incomes (the bottom 5 per cent before housing costs), 
and are vulnerable to misreporting and so less reliable than the other thresholds.30 
29 Cribb, Joyce and Phillips (2012), figures 4.1a and 4.1b. 
30 Brewer et al. (2009). 
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Table 5: Changes in distribution of incomes by income band, 1996-97 to 2010-11 
Equivalised income as % of median 
<40% 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% 70-80% 80%+ 
Before housing costs: 
Children -0.3 -4.1 -4.6 2.4 2.2 4.4 
Working age with children 0.2 -2.0 -2.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 
Working age without children 1.9 0.6 0.2 -0.2 0.9 -3.4 
Pensioners -0.2 -3.5 -3.2 -4.5 0.2 11.3 
All individuals 0.6 -1.8 -2.1 0.0 1.2 2.1 
After housing costs: 
Children -0.7 -6.8 0.8 2.0 1.9 2.8 
Working age with children 0.6 -3.6 0.7 1.1 1.3 -0.1 
Working age without children 1.9 0.5 0.0 1.2 1.2 -4.9 
Pensioners -0.1 -4.0 -11.0 0.1 1.5 13.4 
All individuals 0.6 -2.9 -1.7 1.2 1.4 1.4 
Source: Sefton et al. (2009), table 2.3, updated using own analysis of HBAI datasets 1994-95 to 2010-
11. Figures show the change (in percentage points) in the proportion of the population in each band.
Policy impacts 
The reductions that were seen against the conventional 60 per cent poverty line owed 
much to the redistributive effects of the reforms to the tax and cash transfer systems. 
For instance the modelling in Sefton, Hills and Sutherland (2009, figure 2.6(b)) 
suggests that the child poverty rate would have been 8 percentage points higher than it 
actually was in 2008-09, if the 1996-97 system had been continued, uprated in line 
with earnings.31 The unreformed system would have left child poverty 3 percentage 
points higher – rather than 5 percentage points lower – than the rate in 1996-97. This 
implies that other changes in the distribution of market incomes meant that part of 
Labour’s redistributive effort was needed simply for child poverty to stand still. By 
contrast, the pensioner poverty rate was 3 percentage points lower than it would have 
been with an unreformed system, but the actual fall in pensioner poverty up to that 
date shown in Figure 9 was somewhat larger. Other factors (such as improved pension 
rights for new pensioners) were tending to reduce pensioner poverty as well, 
reinforcing the effects of the policy reforms. 
By contrast, the increase in the poverty rate for working-age adults without children 
would have been slightly smaller without the reforms (compared to an earnings-linked 
base) than it actually was. To the extent that Labour had a strategy for reducing 
31 If the comparison is made with a base system uprated in line only with prices since 1997, the 
fall in poverty due to the reforms is much larger; see Joyce and Sibieta (2013), figures 9 and 
10. 
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working age poverty for those without children, it was embodied in its early slogan, 
“work for those who can, security for those who cannot.” However, its reliance on 
promoting work and making work pay was not enough to succeed in bringing poverty 
down for this group.  
Material deprivation 
Labour’s child poverty targets also included a measure of whether children were 
living in a household with a low income in relative terms (below 70 per cent of 
median income) and were ‘materially deprived’, in the sense of lacking particular 
items, commonly seen as necessities.  The official series for this combined measure 
shows 17 per cent of children affected in 2004-05, when the series starts, falling to 16 
per cent in 2009-10, and 14 per cent in 2010-11.32 Much of this fall is driven by that in 
relative poverty over the period, rather than in material deprivation by itself. Recent 
initial analysis of the ‘poverty and social exclusion’ (PSE) survey suggests a rise in 
material deprivation on the definitions it uses comparing surveys carried out in 1999 
and 2012 (last three quarters).33 However the second of these surveys is more than 
two years after Labour left office, and will reflect changes since then. Some indication 
of what may have been happening through the main part of Labour’s period in office 
is shown in Figure 10, using the now discontinued Families and Children Survey 
(FACS). Looking back to 1999 is only possible on a consistent basis for lone parents, 
for whom deprivation fell sharply in several respects between 1999 and 2002, and 
then more slowly up to 2006.34 Looking at all families with children, the figure 
suggests that material deprivation may have reached a low point around 2005, but 
then rose. It shows results from 2001 for the proportions who said they lacked an item 
because they could not afford it. For nearly all of the items, there were falls between 
2001 and 2005 (at the same time that income poverty was falling on both a relative 
and absolute basis for children and their parents). However, for several of the items, 
deprivation rose again between 2005 and 2008 (when income poverty was roughly 
constant on both bases).  
32 DWP (2012), table 4.5tr. 
33 Gordon et al. (2013). 
34 Stewart (2009), table 3.2. 
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Figure 10: Indicators of material deprivation for families with children, 2001-
2008 (% stating that they would like the item but could not afford it) 
Source: Families and Children Survey (FACS). 
International comparisons 
Table 6 shows how the changes in the overall poverty rate in the UK measured by 
OECD in a similar way to Figure 8 over the period from the ‘mid-1990s’ (1994-95 for 
the UK) to the ‘late 2000s’ (2008-09 for the UK) compared with 26 other countries. 
At the start of the period, the UK’s poverty rate, at 19.3 per cent, was the twelfth 
highest. It was then one of the 13 countries to record a fall in poverty, but this only 
took it down to thirteenth in this particular league table.  
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Table 6: Poverty rates in mid-1990s and late 2000s, OECD countries (% of 
population with equivalent net incomes below 60% of median) 
mid-90s late-2000s Change 
Sweden 7.9 16.4 8.5 
Finland 9.1 15.6 6.5 
Czech Republic 9.9 10.3 0.4 
Denmark 11.5 13.4 1.9 
Luxembourg 12.4 15.6 3.2 
Germany 12.7 14.8 2.1 
Norway 13.4 13.3 -0.1 
Austria 13.7 12.8 -0.9 
France 14.1 13.5 -0.6 
Hungary 14.4 12.2 -2.2 
Netherlands 15.2 13.1 -2.1 
New Zealand 15.8 19.0 3.2 
Canada 17.1 19.4 2.3 
Belgium 17.6 16.3 -1.4 
Spain 18.6 20.6 2.0 
United Kingdom 19.3 18.4 -0.9 
Japan 19.8 21.7 1.9 
Ireland 20.7 16.8 -3.8 
Israel 20.8 26.8 6.0 
Australia 20.8 21.7 0.9 
Greece 21.7 17.8 -3.9 
Italy 21.8 19.9 -1.9 
Portugal 22.1 18.5 -3.6 
Turkey 23.5 24.0 0.6 
United States 23.8 24.4 0.6 
Chile 26.8 25.1 -1.7 
Mexico 27.8 27.2 -0.6 
Source: OECD poverty database (extracted 2 April 2013). 
Eurostat also produces statistics on the ‘at risk of poverty rate’ measured in a similar 
way, with some breakdowns between age groups. Its figures for the older fifteen EU 
members allow some comparisons between 2001 and 2010, which are summarised in 
Table 7. Over this period the overall poverty rate in the EU15 countries rose from 15 
per cent to 16.2 per cent, while the figure for the UK fell from 18 to 17.1 per cent. But 
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despite its improvement while the overall average was worsening, the UK’s ranking 
fell from tenth to eleventh, slipping behind Ireland in this league table (where first has 
the lowest rate). A consistent time series for children is not available, but the UK’s 
rate for children under 18 in 2010 was only slightly higher than the EU15 average, 
leaving it in tenth place overall. This is in the context where a similar league table 
showed the UK with the worst child poverty rate (for under-16s) in 1998, with a rate 
10 percentage points worse than the EU15 average.35 For those aged 65 or over, the 
fall in poverty in the UK, from 27 to 21.4 per cent in this series was much faster than 
that for the EU15 as a whole, but despite this the UK slipped down to being the 14th 
worst out of the fifteen countries. As with the OECD series, this table suggests that the 
UK’s poverty rates were improving compared to international averages, but not fast 
enough to improve in its overall rankings. The table also shows that the median 
poverty gap – the extent to which the median person in poverty falls below the 
poverty line – deteriorated in the UK but more quickly in the EU15 as a whole, but the 
UK also slipped to tenth worst on this measure.  
Table 7: At risk of poverty rates in fifteen European Union countries, 2001 and 
2010 
EU15 (%) UK (%) UK ranking (1st is 
best) 
2001 2010 2001 2010 2001 2010 
At risk of poverty rate: 
Total 15 16.2 18 17.1 10th 11th 
Under 18 na 19.8 Na 20.3 - 10th 
65 or over 18 16.3 27 21.4 12th 14th 
Median poverty gap 15 18.0 19 21.4 9th 10th 
Source: EUROSTAT, statistical database on income and living conditions (downloaded 27 April 
2013). 
Summary 
Using the most prominent of the available measures, relative income poverty fell 
between 1996-97 and 2010-11. This took its level to the lowest for 25 years. For 
children the fall was by a third (before housing costs) – a considerable change, but 
falling short of the government’s target of halving it. For pensioners, it fell by a 
quarter. Both of these reductions were in large part due to the redistributive reforms of 
the tax and benefit systems. Indeed, without them, child poverty would have risen. But 
relative poverty rose for working age adults without children – reforms such as the 
New Deals and the National Minimum Wage were not enough to offset the effects of 
other labour market changes and the way in which working age benefits in general 
35 Stewart (2009), figure 13.1. 
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remained linked to prices. Some take the view that poverty should be measured 
against fixed real thresholds, as with the core US poverty line. In these terms, poverty 
increased in the final year at the end of Labour’s period in office. However, taking the 
period since 1996-97 to 2010-11 as a whole, poverty against an absolute standard 
halved and fell by nearly two-thirds for children. Notably, whether measured against 
an absolute or a relative standard, poverty rates for children, those of working age, and 
pensioners converged to similar levels, where there had been wide differences at the 
start. There is not a consistent time series for levels of material deprivation over the 
whole period, but partial surveys suggest that it fell for families with children between 
2001 and 2005, but then rose again by 2008. In international terms, the decline in 
relative poverty was not enough greatly to shift the UK’s generally poor rankings 
compared to other countries. However, while it had the worst child poverty rate 
amongst fifteen older EU members in the late 1990s, by 2010 its poverty rate for those 
under 18 was only just above the average for those countries, and its ranking had risen 
to tenth out of the fifteen.  
7. Outcomes: Income inequality
What happens to income inequality is a product of many more factors than what 
happens to cash transfers and taxation, although as we have seen they can have 
considerable effects on the bottom of the income distribution. One crucial pressure 
towards growing inequality in the 1980s and 1990s was the widening dispersion of 
earnings, as shown in Table 8, with faster growth the nearer to the top of the 
distribution one looks. What happened in the first and second halves of the New 
Labour period, shown in the final two columns, was rather different. From 1997 to 
2003, earnings growth was more balanced while still relatively rapid. Indeed growth 
in hourly wages was slightly faster at the tenth percentile (below which a tenth of 
workers fall) than at the median, although it continued to be fastest at the very top. 
However, hourly wages were virtually unchanged in real terms in 2010 from what 
they had been in 2003 across the distribution. This stagnation in real wages predated 
the economic crisis from 2008, and came despite continuing growth in GDP up to that 
point. 
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Table 8: Real changes in hourly wages of full-time employees in the UK 
Annualised percentage increase in gross hourly pay 
1980s 1990s 1997-2003 2003-2010 
5th percentile 1.8 1 - - 
10th percentile 1.6 1.1 2.0 0.0 
25th percentile 1.8 1.2 1.7 0.1 
50th percentile 2.3 1.5 1.7 0.2 
75th percentile 3.0 1.9 1.9 0.2 
90th percentile 3.5 2.1 2.3 0.0 
95th percentile 3.8 2.2 3.0 0.0 
Notes: Data from 1980s and 1990s from Sefton et al. (2009), table 2.1, based on Machin and van 
Reenen (2007). Time periods used for each decade are1979-89 and 1989-99. Data from 1997 from 
ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE).  
As well as wages, other factors affect overall income distribution between households, 
particularly levels of unemployment and the distribution of work between households. 
Gregg and Wadsworth (2011, chaper 5) show that by 1997, the polarisation of work 
between households was more unequal than at any time since records begain in the 
mid-1970s. Between 1997 and 2009, the proportion of households with no one in 
work did fall (from 18.2 to 17.3 per cent), but not by enough to return to the position 
of the 1970s or even 1980s. 
The end result of the combination of labour market changes, including these in wages, 
as well as the tax and benefit reforms and other wider societal changes can be seen in 
Figure 11. This contrasts the growth in incomes (before housing costs) at the mid-
point of each tenth of the income distribution between 1996-97 and 2010-11 with that 
between 1979 and 1996-97. In the earlier period, income growth was faster the nearer 
the top of the distribution one looks – nearly 3 per cent annually for those in the top 
tenth, five times as fast as for those in the bottom tenth. Wherever one looked, and 
however it was measured, income inequality grew. The New Labour period is very 
different. Income growth was fastest for the second and third tenths of the distribution, 
accounting for the falls in relative poverty discussed in the previous section. But it 
was also higher right at the top than in the middle, and was slowest for the poorest 
tenth (although still faster than in the Conservative period). 
This pattern means that different measures of income distribution produce different 
results, as can be seen in Figure 12 (for Great Britain, to give a consistent time series 
back to 1961). This shows two of the most commonly used measures. The 90:10 ratio 
compares the incomes of those near the top (at the 90th percentile) with those near the 
bottom (at the 10th percentile). In the 1960s and 1970s this ratio was at or just above 
three.  There was then a step rise in the 1980s, and it was above four until the final 
year in the series. Broadly speaking, over the Labour period it was constant, dipping 
by 2003-04 before rising again and then falling in the last two years to what was 
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(marginally) its lowest level for 25 years. The second measure is the well-known Gini 
coefficient. This summarises inequality across the whole of the distribution, including 
what is happening at the very bottom and very top. Again this was broadly flat over 
the Labour period as a whole, with a rise to in the years from 2004-05 to 2007-08, 
leaving it above the starting point in 2009-10, but with a dramatic fall in the final year 
which left its level close to where it had started in 1996-97. 
Figure 11: Net income growth at annual rate by income group, 1979 to 1996-97 
and 1996-97 to 2010-11 (%) 
Source: DWP/IFS Households Below Average Income analysis (from IFS Poverty and Inequality 
spreadsheet 2012). 
Figure 12: Income inequality, 1961 to 2010-11 (before housing costs, GB) 
Source: IFS Inequality and Poverty spreadsheet, 2012. 
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These patterns result from the interaction of several factors: 
 Some improvement in the very lowest earnings, partly associated with the
national Minimum Wage, and more balanced growth (to 2003) across most of
the earnings distribution.
 Gains for low-income families with children and pensioners.
 Declines in the relative position of workless adults without children.
 Continued rapid growth in the very highest incomes.36
International comparisons 
Figure 13 shows the OECD’s ranking of income inequality (using the Gini coefficient 
for net household income) for 27 countries in the mid-1990s and late 2000s (as in 
Table 6). Over this period (to 2008-09 for the UK) OECD’s calculations suggest a 
small rise in the coefficient for the UK from 33.6 to 34.2 per cent. With falling 
inequality in Spain and Italy, this meant that the UK rose from ninth to seventh 
highest, behind only Portugal of the European countries included, and only Portugal 
and the USA of the richer countries. 
36 Brewer, Sibieta and Wren-Lewis (2008); Joyce and Sibieta (2013). 
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Figure 13: Income inequality, OECD countries in mid-1990s and late 2000s (Gini 
coefficient, %) 
Source: OECD inequality and poverty database (extracted 2 April 2013). Figures are for net 
equivalent income. 
Summary 
While inequality had increased at all points in the income distribution in the 1980s, 
and across the Conservative period from 1979 to 1996-97 taken as a whole, what 
happened under the Labour government depends on the measure used. Comparing 
incomes near the top with those near the bottom, income inequality fluctuated around 
a roughly constant level between 1996-97 and 2010-11, but with a fall in the final two 
years taking it below the inherited level. By contrast, the Gini coefficient measure 
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affected by incomes right at the top and bottom was higher in 2009-10 than in 1996-
97, but a sharp fall in the final year took it back to its starting point. The growing 
incomes at the very top of the distribution were an important reason for the difference 
between these two measures. The results depend on the exact start and end years 
chosen. The fairest summary is probably that income inequality was broadly constant 
over the period as a whole. The UK remained near the top of the international income 
inequality range, in 2008-09 behind only Portugal and the USA of the richer countries 
compared by OECD. 
8. Outcomes: Economic inequality by age and gender
The analysis carried out for the National Equality Panel and updated to 2010 in 
parallel research as part of this programme37 allows us to look at changes in economic 
inequality across a wider range of dimensions and between and within groups defined 
in ways other than just their position in the income distribution. Limitations in the 
available data restrict the comparisons that can be made between the situation in the 
late 1990s and 2010, but these are possible for measures of hourly wages, weekly 
incomes, and equivalent incomes (as in the HBAI series used in the previous section). 
We concentrate here on those by gender and by age.38 
Table 9 shows inequalities both between men and women and within the two genders 
on these three measures. In all three respects overall gender inequality declined 
substantially, with the median level for women rising relative to the overall median, 
and that for men falling. Median equivalent net income for both men and women were 
both above the overall median in 2010; the median for children was lower. Within the 
two groups, however, inequality as measured by the 90:10 ratio changed less, with the 
most notable change being widening inequality in men’s weekly earnings (which 
occurred after 2006-08) and a decline in the inequality of women’s equivalent net 
income. 
37 See Hills, et al. (2010) and Hills, Cunliffe, Gambaro and Obolenskaya (2013) for detailed 
description of the sources of data used here and in other tables and figures in this section.. 
38 See Hills, et al. (2010), chapter 10, for a wider range of comparisons between the positions of 
different groups between years around 1996 and those around 2007. Data available on the 
CASE website also allow extension of these results to 2010. 
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Table 9: Inequality in earnings and household incomes by gender, 1995-1997 and 
2010 
Group median as % 
overall median 
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio) 
1995-1997 2010 1995-1997 2010 
(a) Hourly wages 
Men 
Women 
118 
86 
113 
91 
4.2 
3.7 
4.2 
3.6 
(b) Weekly earnings 
Men 
Women 
112 
82 
108 
87 
3.7 
3.5 
4.0 
3.5 
(d) Equivalent net income (BHC) 
Men 
Women 
104 
96 
106 
101 
4.2 
4.1 
4.1 
3.9 
Source: Labour Force Survey (UK 1995 to 1997; 2010), DWP from Family Resources Survey 
(GB1997-98; UK 2010-11). 
Note: The time frame is 1997-98 and 2010-11 for equivalent net income (where the population 
covered also includes children). 
These overall changes by gender were the product, however, of some very varied 
patterns when also split by age. Table 10 concentrates on comparing those in their 
twenties and in their fifties at the two dates (with more detail shown in Appendix 
Table A3). There was a sharp decline in the relative hourly wages and weekly 
earnings of men in their twenties, but smaller declines for women. However, the 
relative position of men in their late fifties improved, and that for women in both their 
early and late fifties improved substantially. Notably, within nearly all of these groups 
there were generally small declines in inequality, however, with the main exception of 
weekly earnings for both men and women in their early fifties, where inequality 
increased.  
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Table 10: Inequality in wages and earnings by gender and selected ages, 1995-
1997 and 2010 
Group median as % 
overall median 
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio) 
1995-1997 2010 1995-1997 2010 
(a) Hourly wages (all employees) 
Men 20-24 
25-29 
50-54 
55-59 
79 
109 
131 
113 
72 
96 
128 
120 
2.8 
3.1 
4.0 
4.0 
2.5 
2.9 
4.2 
4.0 
Women 20-24 
25-29 
50-54 
55-59 
73 
96 
86 
79 
69 
90 
95 
90 
2.6 
3.1 
3.6 
3.4 
2.5 
2.9 
3.6 
3.4 
(b) Weekly earnings (full-time) 
Men 20-24 
25-29 
50-54 
55-59 
72 
101 
122 
105 
66 
92 
121 
112 
2.7 
2.9 
3.5 
3.6 
2.5 
2.8 
4.0 
3.8 
Women 20-24 
25-29 
50-54 
55-59 
64 
86 
82 
77 
62 
84 
90 
83 
2.4 
2.7 
3.4 
3.4 
2.5 
2.8 
3.7 
3.4 
Source: Table A3. 
Table 11 shows related results for equivalent incomes for all individuals by age in 
1997-98 and 2010-11. What is most notable here are the substantial improvements in 
the relative positions of children aged up to 10 and those aged over 60, but the 
considerable deterioration in the positions of the groups aged from 17 to 30. This is 
also shown in Figure 14, which shows the median equivalent net incomes of each age 
group in 1997-98 and 2010-11. Real incomes grew most for children (particularly 
younger ones), based on their households’ incomes, and older adults. Growth in real 
incomes was very small for those in their 20s. Relative incomes fell back notably for 
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those aged 17-30 (particularly in the period after the crisis in 2007).39 Incomes for 
those in their 30s and early 40s grew, however, partly reflecting the extra support for 
families with children. The result was a much flatter pattern of incomes by age at the 
end of the period than at its start, as Figure 15 makes clear. In 1997-98, median 
incomes for age groups above 70 ranged from 72-74 per cent of the overall median; 
by 2010-11 they ranged from 83-86 per cent of it. At the start the median for age 
groups under 17 ranged from 84-87 per cent of the overall median; by 2010-11 they 
ranged from 89-92 per cent.  The range across all age groups was from 72 per cent 
(76-80s) to 128 per cent (46-50s) in 1997-98. This narrowed to 83 per cent (over 80s) 
to 117 per cent (51-55s) in 2010-11. In terms of one of the main aims of social 
security systems – smoothing incomes across the life cycle – this is a very striking 
success.  
Table 11: Inequality in equivalent net income by age, 1997-98 and 2010-11 
Group median as % 
overall median 
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio) 
1997-98 2010-11 1997-98 2010-11 
0-5 
6-10 
11-16 
17-20 
21-25 
26-30 
31-35 
36-40 
41-45 
46-50 
51-55 
55-60 
61-65 
66-70 
71-75 
76-80 
80+ 
85 
84 
87 
101 
117 
119 
112 
108 
116 
128 
124 
106 
95 
82 
74 
72 
73 
90 
92 
89 
91 
101 
112 
116 
110 
110 
115 
117 
107 
102 
94 
86 
84 
83 
3.8 
3.7 
3.6 
3.9 
3.9 
4.2 
4.4 
4.3 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
3.9 
3.2 
3.0 
3.2 
3.2 
3.6 
3.4 
3.5 
3.7 
3.7 
3.8 
4.4 
4.3 
4.1 
4.1 
4.4 
4.7 
4.2 
3.2 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
Source: DWP based on Family Resources Survey (GB 1997-98; UK 2010-11). 
At the same time, Table 11 shows that income inequality within most income groups 
fell or was constant, with the exception of the (relatively affluent) groups aged 
between 50 and 65, where inequality increased. The overall level of inequality shown 
39 See Hills et al. (2013), section 9 for more details and discussion. 
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by the 90:10 ratio in Figure 12 was a small fall – this was the result of falls in 
inequality within most age groups, and between the previously poorest age groups and 
the median, but partly offset by some increases in inequality within the most affluent 
age groups. 
Figure 15: Difference in median net income for each age group from overall 
median, 1997-98 and 2010-11 (%) 
Source: DWP analysis of Family Resources Survey (GB 1997-98; UK 2010-11). 
-40
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Figure 14: Equivalent net income by age (£/week, 2010-11 prices, before housing 
costs)
Source: DWP based on Family Resources Survey (GB 1997-98; UK 2010-11).
Author’s note: This revised figure corrects one included in earlier versions of this 
paper, where the price adjustment of the two series was inconsistent.
Summary 
Looking over the period as a whole from 1995-1997 (or 1997-98 for net incomes) to 
2010, inequalities between men and women reduced for all three of hourly wages, 
weekly earnings, and equivalent net incomes. Within gender groups, the inequality of 
men’s weekly earnings increased, but inequality in women’s net incomes declined. A 
very pronounced feature of the period was that inequalities between age groups 
declined, with the median incomes of those aged 16 or under and those aged over 60 
increasing towards the overall median. Incomes by 2010-11 varied much less by age 
than at the start. In terms of one of the main aims of social security systems – 
smoothing incomes across the life cycle – this is a very striking success. This is 
clearly related to the ways in which policy focused on children and pensioners. 
Relative incomes fell back notably for those aged 17-30 (particularly in the period 
after the crisis in 2007). While inequalities fell within most age groups, they became 
wider for those aged 51-65. 
9. Summary and conclusions
New Labour’s aims for poverty and inequality were selective. Child and pensioner 
income poverty – including when measured in relative terms – were key priorities, but 
only alongside much wider objectives for life chances and social inclusion. Equality 
was discussed in terms of equality of opportunity, not of outcomes, and little emphasis 
put on inequalities at the top of the distribution. 
Cash transfers from the state were not seen – rhetorically, at least – as being the 
central instrument for achieving these objectives. The default assumption was that 
benefits and tax allowances and brackets would be adjusted annually in line with price 
inflation, not in line with overall living standards. For the working age population the 
emphasis was on education, training, ‘making work pay’ and support into work rather 
than real increases in social security benefits. By contrast, financial support for 
families with children through tax credits in and out of work was made more generous 
in real terms in pursuit of child poverty reduction targets. 
Overall spending on benefits and tax credits rose in real terms from £114 billion in 
1996-97 to £181.5 billion in 2009-10 and £182.8 billion in 2010-11 (at 2009-10 
prices), that is by 60-61 per cent. However, there was not a picture of spending on 
cash transfers (including tax credits) rising out of control. Until the crisis cash 
transfers were kept within a constant share of GDP, just under 11 per cent, with those 
for pensioners and aimed at families with children gaining at the expense of other 
working age benefits. By 2009-10 and 2010-11, working age benefits other than for 
children were still more than an eighth smaller as a share of national income than 
Labour had inherited in 1997. It was spending on the priority areas of pensioners 
(including some effects of an ageing population) and families with children where 
spending rose as a share on national income, and it was only for the latter where this 
meant that UK spending rose significantly in international terms. Overall, spending on 
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cash transfers remained in the bottom half of the range in relation to national income 
in all OECD countries, and was one of the two lowest in Western Europe in 2009. 
Labour’s policies resulted in a clear restructuring of the benefit system for those out of 
work – with benefits getting closer to the poverty line for families with children and 
above it for pensioners, but falling further behind it for others without children. The 
most striking policy effects came with the first wave of tax credit reform in 1999, 
which improved net incomes in relation to the poverty line for families with children 
in low paid work. Out of work incomes for families with children rose to some extent 
at the same time and continued to rise slowly in relation to the poverty line. Pension 
reforms took minimum incomes for pensions up to or even above the poverty line, but 
working age benefits for those without children who were out of work fell further 
below it. 
A corollary of such changes might have been expected to be deteriorating work 
incentives for those with children.  However, the actual overall pattern of incentives to 
work at all was little different in 2009 -10 than it had been in 1996-97. What did 
reduce somewhat was the incentive for some of those in work to earn more, 
particularly as more working families were affected by the tax credit means-tests: 
such families were better off than they would have been without the tax credits, but at 
the margin gained less from extra earnings. 
Labour’s tax and benefit reforms were redistributive towards those with low incomes 
on average. The scale of this was relatively modest when compared with the inherited 
system (if it had been uprated in line with measures of income growth). Redistribution 
was, however, selective, with families with children and pensioners gaining but 
workless single people and couples without children losing. 
In terms of outcomes, relative income poverty fell between 1996-97 and 2010-11 to 
its lowest level for 25 years. For children the fall was by a third (before housing costs) 
– a considerable change, but falling short of the government’s target of halving it. For
pensioners, it fell by a quarter. Both of these reductions were in large part due to the 
redistributive reforms; without them, child poverty would have risen. But relative 
poverty rose for working age adults without children – labour market reforms were 
not enough to offset the effects of other changes and the linking of working age 
benefits in general only to prices. Against fixed real thresholds, poverty increased in 
the year in which Labour’s period in office ended, but between 1996-97 to 2010-11 
taken as a whole poverty against an absolute standard halved and fell by nearly two-
thirds for children. Notably, whether measured against an absolute or a relative 
standard, poverty rates for children, those of working age, and pensioners converged 
to similar levels, where there had been wide differences at the start.  
In international terms, the decline in relative poverty was not enough greatly to shift 
the UK’s generally poor rankings compared to other countries. However, while it had 
the worst child poverty rate amongst fifteen older EU members in the late 1990s, by 
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2010 its poverty rate for those under 18 was only just above the average for those 
countries. 
Comparing incomes near the top with those near the bottom, income inequality 
fluctuated around a roughly constant level between 1996-97 and 2010-11, but with a 
fall in the final two years taking it below the inherited level. By contrast, the Gini 
coefficient measure, affected by incomes right at the top and bottom, was higher in 
2009-10 than in 1996-97, but a sharp fall in the final year took it back to its starting 
point in 2010-11. The growing incomes at the very top of the distribution were an 
important reason for the difference between these measures.  The UK remained near 
the top of the international income inequality range for OECD countries, in 2008-09 
behind only Portugal and the USA amongst the richer countries. 
Gender inequalities reduced for hourly wages, weekly earnings, and equivalent net 
incomes. Within gender groups, the inequality of men’s weekly earnings increased, 
but inequality in women’s net incomes declined. 
A very pronounced feature of the period was that inequalities between age groups 
declined, with the median incomes of those aged 16 or under and those aged over 60 
increasing towards the overall median. Incomes by 2010-11 varied much less by age 
than at the start. This is clearly related to the ways in which policy focused on children 
and pensioners. Relative incomes fell back notably for those aged 17-30 (particularly 
in the period after the crisis in 2007).  
In one way this paper describes a fairly simple story of policy priorities and outcomes. 
New Labour prioritised reductions in child poverty and pensioner poverty, carried out 
a series of reforms designed to address them, increased the share of national income 
going as cash transfers to children and pensioners, and increased the value of cash 
transfers to them relative to the poverty line. By the end of the period both child 
poverty and pensioner poverty had fallen considerably, whereas child poverty would 
have risen without the policy reforms (and pensioner poverty fallen less). New Labour 
gave much less prominence to reducing poverty for working age adults without 
children – and did not see cash transfers as the way to achieve this – or to reducing 
overall income inequalities, particularly those at the top of the distribution. Poverty 
for working-age adults without children increased, while income inequality was 
broadly flat comparing the start and end of Labour’s term in office. 
As corollaries of these policies and their outcomes there were also two striking and 
related outcomes. First, the risks of poverty converged between children, their parents, 
pensioners, and other working age adults. Being a child or a pensioner no longer 
meant a much greater poverty risk than others. Second, while considerable inequalities 
remained within each age group, there was much less difference in net incomes 
between age groups at the end of Labour’s period than at the start. In terms of one of 
the main aims of social security systems – smoothing incomes across the life cycle – 
this could be seen as a very striking success, albeit one that Labour itself did not 
emphasise much. 
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In looking forward to the Coalition’s period in office, Labour’s pension reforms are 
being carried forward and in some ways extended, with continued protection of 
pensions and other old-age benefits, and linking, for instance, of the basic pension to 
the higher of earnings and prices. But within an objective of cuts in overall spending, 
transfers for working age families – including those for children – are being cut in real 
terms and subject to a series of limits and reforms in part designed to reduce their 
levels. Labour’s achievements in reducing pensioner poverty, and in smoothing 
incomes at the later stages of the life cycle look more likely to endure than those of 
reducing child poverty and smoothing incomes at the start of the life cycle. 
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Appendix 
 Table A1: Benefit and tax credit spending, 1996-97 to 2010-11 (Great Britain) 
£ billion at 2009-10 prices % TME % GDP 
 
Total 
Other 
w age Child Pens Total 
Other 
w age Child Pens Total 
Other 
w age Child Pens 
96-97 113.8 40.8 16.0 57.0 27.4 9.8 3.8 13.7 10.8 3.9 1.5 5.4 
97-98 113.1 38.7 16.0 58.4 27.3 9.3 3.9 14.1 10.3 3.5 1.5 5.3 
98-99 113.7 37.7 16.1 59.9 27.2 9.0 3.9 14.3 10.1 3.3 1.4 5.3 
99-00 117.3 36.6 18.0 62.7 27.6 8.6 4.2 14.8 10.0 3.1 1.5 5.4 
00-01 123.4 36.5 20.8 66.1 29.3 8.7 4.9 15.7 10.1 3.0 1.7 5.4 
01-02 129.0 36.6 22.4 69.9 27.4 7.8 4.8 14.8 10.3 2.9 1.8 5.6 
02-03 133.4 37.3 23.7 72.4 26.8 7.5 4.8 14.6 10.4 2.9 1.8 5.6 
03-04 143.4 38.2 30.7 74.5 27.3 7.3 5.8 14.2 10.8 2.9 2.3 5.6 
04-05 148.1 38.4 31.9 77.8 26.8 6.9 5.8 14.1 10.9 2.8 2.3 5.7 
05-06 151.9 38.7 32.4 80.7 26.4 6.7 5.6 14.0 10.8 2.7 2.3 5.7 
06-07 152.9 39.2 32.6 81.1 26.0 6.7 5.6 13.8 10.6 2.7 2.3 5.6 
07-08 158.2 40.3 33.3 84.6 26.0 6.6 5.5 13.9 10.6 2.7 2.2 5.7 
08-09 168.1 42.0 36.6 89.5 26.2 6.6 5.7 14.0 11.6 2.9 2.5 6.2 
09-10 181.5 47.7 39.6 94.3 27.0 7.1 5.9 14.0 12.8 3.4 2.8 6.7 
10-11 182.8 48.1 39.5 95.2 27.2 7.2 5.9 14.2 12.7 3.3 2.7 6.6 
Source: DWP (2013). Figures are on a consistent basis over time, excluding for instance Income 
Support ‘board and lodging’ payments for residential care that are now classed within other parts of 
public spending. They also exclude Council Tax Benefit (but include Housing Benefit). 
Note: Spending on non-pensioner benefits is divided here between items aimed at children – mainly 
Child Benefit, Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit for families with children (and their earlier 
equivalents, such as Family Credit and WFTC) – and other transfers for the working age population 
(which includes items such as the adult parts of Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance, including 
for parents, as well as Housing Benefit for working age families, and Working Tax Credit for non-
parents). Working Tax Credit divided between parents and non-parents using data from HMRC Child 
and Working Tax Credits 2012, table 1.1. 
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Table A2: Public spending on cash transfers as % of GDP, 1995 and 2009, by 
client group 
Total Old age/ 
survivors 
Family benefits Other cash 
benefits 
1995 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009 
        Finland 20.2 17.0 8.8 9.9 2.7 1.7 8.7 5.4 
Austria 19.1 19.2 12.3 13.5 2.6 2.3 4.2 3.4 
Poland 17.5 15.2 9.5 11.8 1.1 0.8 6.9 2.6 
Belgium 17.3 18.1 9.3 10.0 2.1 1.8 5.9 6.3 
France 17.1 18.9 12.0 13.7 1.5 1.4 3.6 3.8 
Sweden 16.6 13.7 8.1 8.2 1.9 1.6 6.6 3.9 
Denmark 16.4 14.0 6.2 6.1 1.8 1.6 8.4 6.3 
Germany 15.4 15.7 10.5 11.2 1.4 1.2 3.5 3.3 
Netherlands 15.0 11.4 5.7 5.1 1.0 0.8 8.3 5.5 
Spain 14.9 16.0 9.0 9.3 0.3 0.7 5.6 6.0 
Luxembourg 14.6 14.4 8.8 7.6 2.2 3.5 3.6 3.3 
Italy 14.1 18.9 11.3 15.5 0.4 0.8 2.4 2.6 
Norway 12.9 11.6 5.5 5.4 2.2 1.4 5.2 4.8 
Slovak Republic 11.8 11.3 6.3 7.0 2.4 1.6 3.1 2.7 
Greece 11.6 15.7 9.6 13.1 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.6 
New Zealand 11.6 10.6 5.7 4.7 2.0 2.5 3.9 3.4 
Canada 11.0 10.0 4.7 4.5 0.8 0.9 5.5 4.6 
Portugal 11.0 16.9 7.2 12.3 0.6 1.0 3.2 3.6 
Ireland 10.8 13.8 4.4 5.1 2.0 3.3 4.4 5.4 
United Kingdom 10.7 11.8 5.3 6.2 1.8 2.5 3.6 3.1 
Czech Republic 10.4 12.7 6.1 8.3 1.8 1.2 2.5 3.2 
Israel 9.4 9.4 4.8 5.0 1.7 1.1 2.9 3.3 
Australia 9.0 8.0 3.7 3.5 2.1 1.9 3.2 2.6 
United States 8.3 9.6 6.3 6.8 0.3 0.1 1.7 2.7 
Chile 7.9 5.4 6.7 3.6 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.1 
Japan 7.5 12.4 6.0 10.2 0.2 0.5 1.3 1.7 
Iceland 6.3 7.7 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.6 2.4 4.4 
Turkey 3.7 7.3 2.7 6.8 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.5 
Korea 1.6 3.4 1.2 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.3 
Mexico 1.2 2.7 0.7 1.7 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Source: OECD social expenditure dataset (extracted 2 April 2013). For UK, 2009 figures are for 
financial year 2009-10 and family benefits include tax credits. 
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Table A3: Inequality in wages and earnings by gender and age, 1995-1997 and 
2010 
Group median as % 
overall median 
Inequality within groups 
(90:10 ratio) 
1995-1997 2010 1995-1997 2010 
(a) Hourly wages 
Men 16-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
53 
79 
109 
130 
140 
145 
147 
131 
113 
99 
81 
53 
72 
96 
120 
135 
134 
133 
128 
120 
104 
93 
2.9 
2.8 
3.1 
3.4 
3.6 
3.7 
3.9 
4.0 
4.0 
3.7 
6.3 
2.9 
2.5 
2.9 
3.5 
4.0 
4.4 
4.1 
4.2 
4.0 
4.0 
4.6 
Women 16-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
53 
73 
96 
101 
93 
92 
90 
86 
79 
75 
52 
69 
90 
108 
107 
98 
96 
95 
90 
85 
2.9 
2.6 
3.1 
3.7 
3.9 
3.9 
3.8 
3.6 
3.4 
3.4 
2.8 
2.5 
2.9 
3.5 
3.7 
3.6 
3.6 
3.6 
3.4 
3.5 
(b) Weekly earnings 
Men 16-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
46 
72 
101 
121 
129 
133 
134 
122 
105 
92 
48 
66 
92 
111 
125 
125 
125 
121 
112 
100 
3.0 
2.7 
2.9 
3.1 
3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
3.5 
3.6 
3.1 
3.4 
2.5 
2.8 
3.3 
3.8 
4.2 
3.8 
4.0 
3.8 
3.8 
Women 16-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
45 
64 
86 
99 
92 
88 
85 
82 
77 
71 
45 
62 
84 
102 
103 
92 
90 
90 
83 
77 
3.0 
2.4 
2.7 
3.2 
3.6 
3.5 
3.4 
3.4 
3.4 
3.3 
3.2 
2.5 
2.8 
3.5 
3.7 
3.7 
3.7 
3.7 
3.4 
3.6 
Source: Own analysis of Labour Force Survey. 
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